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Assessing the Impact of Wage Bargaining and Worker Preferences 





The extent to which male earnings exceed those of females, commonly referred to as 
the gender wage gap, is a topic of constant debate within both academic and policy 
circles. The potential factors underlying the gap and, more particularly, the role of 
individual characteristics as opposed to discrimination, have been widely debated 
within the economics literature since the early 1970s. It is widely accepted that the 
gender wage gap has declined steadily in recent decades within most developed 
economies1. However, despite a trend decline the wage differential remains 
substantial in many countries (see Kunze, 2000).  
 
Within the recent literature a range of policy initiatives have been advocated to lessen 
the gap; some target females prior to labour market entry in order to avoid gender 
stereotyping, while others focus on maintaining female participation following entry 
to employment. In relation to post-employment, the recommended measures tend to 
be aimed at improving levels of labour market attachment with policies generally 
centred on flexible working arrangements and childcare provision.  Minimum wage 
legislation and the use of centralised wage bargaining systems have also been 
commonly put forward as a means of improving the relative position of females.  
 
The principal objective of this paper is to use Irish data to examine the impact of 
institutional and wage bargaining factors on the gender wage gap.  Due largely to data 
constraints, industrial relations policies’ attract relatively little attention within the 
literature despite the existence of some compelling arguments to support their impact. 
With respect to wage setting, it has been asserted that collective bargaining structures 
may reduce wage differentials by eliminating wage differences both within and across 
sectors and firms (Plasman & Sissoko, 2004). Minimum wages may also reduce the 
wage gap as women are more heavily located in lower segments of the wage 
distribution; thus, any policy, which reduces the level of wage dispersion, should also 
                                                 
1 See Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebner (2005) for an over-view of the international literature.  
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reduce the gender wage gap (Plasman & Sissoko, 2004). However, it has also been 
argued that there may be negative consequences of the minimum wage via increases 
in the cost of basic childcare provision and other domestic services (Arulampalam, 
Booth, & Bryan (2007)).  
 
In relation to the existing evidence, while a number of studies use employer-employee 
linked datasets to assess the impact of firm-level characteristics on the gender wage 
gap, many do not consider institutional factors (Drolet, 2002; Bayard et al., 2003; 
Vieira et al., 2005; Gupta & Rothstein, 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2006). Of 
those that do, the evidence is somewhat mixed. For instance, Gartner & Gesine (2004) 
and Heinze & Wolf (2006) find, for Germany, that the gender wage gap is lower in 
firms with formalised wage codetermination (i.e. works councils) and those covered 
by collective wage agreements. Mumford & Smith (2007) argue that the introduction 
of the minimum wage in the UK will have led to a reduction in the gender pay gap. 
However, in contrast, Meng (2004), using similar data, finds for Australia that the 
wage gap is narrower in firms that do not implement enterprise-level wage 
bargaining.  
 
A number of other studies have looked at cross-country differences in the gender 
wage gap in order to draw some inferences on the impact of institutional 
arrangements. Blau & Kahn (1995) argue that the magnitude of the gender wage gap 
across industrialised countries is related to the general level of wage inequality. This 
suggests that any increase in the dominance of wage setting institutions, such as 
collective bargaining and the minimum wage, that reduce general wage inequality are 
also likely to lead to a narrowing of the gender wage gap. In contrast, Meng & Meurs 
(2004) argue that a narrower gender wage gap in Australia relative to France was due 
to the more decentralised wage bargaining system that dominates the Australian 
labour market. Preston (2003) also finds that the gender wage gap in Australia 
declined following the increased adoption of decentralised wage bargaining. 
Similarly, Zweimmuller et al. (2007) uses cross-country evidence to suggest that the 
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gender pay gap tends to be lower in more competitive market economies within 
which, presumably, centralised bargaining systems are less in evidence2.  
 
A second objective of this paper is to analyse the role of gender-based preferences 
surrounding job choice on the pay differential. The literature in this area is much more 
limited. While there has been some discussion surrounding the different emphasis that 
males and females place on the labour market over the home (Becker, 1985; Vella, 
1993, 1994), there has been little direct assessment of the extent to which 
motivational differences impact the gender wage gap. The only existing evidence 
relates to a recent study by Swaffield (2007) who finds that after including attitudinal 
controls for females view on home-work balance, family-related labour market 
constraints and labour market aspirations, the gender wage gap is significantly 
reduced. However, while such attitudes will heavily influence an individual’s job 
choice, they do not allow us to directly observe the role of preferences in the job 
selection process.   
 
2.0 Data and Methods 
 
The data used in this study comes from the 2003 National Employment Survey 
(NES), which is a matched employer-employee dataset. The NES is a workplace 
survey, covering both the public and private sectors, which was carried out by the 
Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO). The employer sample was drawn from the 
CSO’s Central Business Register. Selected firms were then asked to extract a 
systematic sample of employees from their payrolls. Approximately 6,500 private 
sector employers and 300 public sector bodies were surveyed across the economy. 
Within this, a total sample of 60,000 employees were included from the private sector 
and 29,000 from the public sector3. In total 54,000 returns were received. After the 
elimination of employees with missing earnings information, part-time students and 
                                                 
2 In relation to other evidence, Plasman & Sissoko (2004), Blau & Kahn (1996, 2000) and Elvira & 
Saporta (2002) present some limited evidence to support the view that collective bargaining reduces the 
gender wage gap. 
3 While the NES was administered to enterprises with 3 plus employees, the results were calibrated to 
the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) employment data for employees (excluding 
agriculture, forestry and fishing), which covers all employees.  
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also restricting our data to those of working age, the final sample included in this 
study consisted of 44,931 employees4.  
 
The employer questionnaire requested data on employee earnings, hour’s worked and 
occupation5. Information was also obtained on ownership type, firm size, industry, the 
use of pay agreements, the percentage of employees covered by the minimum wage 
and provision of certain employee benefits and conditions, specifically career breaks 
and work-sharing and/or part-time work. Employees were issued with a separate 
questionnaire within which they provided information on their age, gender, 
educational attainment, family status, employment status (part-time or full-time), 
length of time in paid employment, length of service with current employer and also 
other job-related characteristics (for example, trade union membership, shift-work, 
supervisory role and flexi hours).  
 
The rich nature of the data available enables us to provide some insight into the 
impact of centralised wage bargaining on the gender wage gap. With respect to the 
industrial relations context at work here, wage bargaining in Ireland has been 
centralized at the national level through a process known as Social Partnership since 
1987. The negotiated outcome is known as the National Wage Agreement (NWA), 
which is determined by negotiations between the Government, the main employer 
bodies and trade unions. Each NWA tends to be tailored to medium term national 
economic and social needs and often builds on its predecessor. Through the social 
partnership process, the national minimum wage was introduced in Ireland in April 
2000. A second question answerable from the data relates to the impact of 
individuals’ motives for working part-time on the wage gap. In addition to addressing 
these two questions, the dataset employed also allows us to assess the impact of 
various family-friendly policies on the wage gap. Where possible, the analysis is 
conducted independently for full-time (FT) and part-time (PT) workers6. The 
                                                 
4 When analysing the employee sample, cross-sectional weights were applied to ensure that the data 
was representative of the population of employees in employment. 
5 The earnings information collected in the 2003 NES represents the gross monthly amount payable by 
the organisation to its employees, and relates to the month of March in 2003. This includes normal 
wages, salaries and overtime; taxable allowances, regular bonuses and commissions; and holiday or 
sick pay for the period in question. It does not include employer’s PRSI, redundancy payments and 
back pay.  
6 Motivational data is only available for PT workers. 
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rationale for separating out FT and PT workers lies in the fact that the nature of jobs 
available to PT and FT workers, and the characteristics of such workers, tend to be 
very different. This is evidenced by the fact that even after controlling for observable 
differences, studies have consistently shown that PT females earn substantially less 
that their FT counterparts (Harkness, 1996; Jepsen, O’Dorchai, Plasman & Rycx, 
2005; Manning & Petrongolo, 2006; Mumford & Smith, 2009). The reasons put 
forward by such studies for this pay gap relate to largely unobservable factors 
including: (a) differing preferences that effect job choice, (b) productivity differences 
related to lower hours of work, and (c) co-ordination difficulties that make it difficult 
for employers to place PT workers in certain positions. Given the evidence suggesting 
substantial differences in both the personal characteristics and job opportunities facing 
FT and PT workers, it is worthwhile to examine these two groups separately. 
 
In terms of methodology, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 
1973) has become the standard approach adopted in studies such as this. However, 
this methodology has been the subject of some criticism; specifically it is associated 
with an index number problem whereby the choice of the reference group will 
influence the results produced by the decomposition. Neumark (1988) developed an 
alternative decomposition that overcomes this issue in which the outputs of a pooled 
model are taken as the reference. However, the Neumark (1988) methodology is 
unsuitable here given that the dominance of females in the PT distribution would 
effectively amount to us taking PT females as a non-discriminatory reference group, 
which clearly makes little sense7.  
 
Apart from the choice of decomposition, there are a number of estimation problems 
that could potentially bias our estimates and need to be given some consideration. The 
principal areas of concern relate to: i) unobserved heterogeneity; ii) the use of 
potential as opposed to actual experience; iii) the truncated nature of the female 
sample; iv) the use of variables that are potentially the product of discrimination and 
gender stereotyping (such as occupation); and finally, v) the choice of wage variable 
used. In an attempt to assess the importance of these factors, Weichselbaumer & 
Winter-Ebner (2005), in an extensive analysis on 1,535 estimates of the unexplained 
                                                 
7 For the FT model, we estimated both Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions and the 
results differed little. 
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gender pay gap taken from 788 studies published in 263 articles covering 63 
countries, find that the choice of data has a much larger impact than the methodology 
employed. They also show that using estimated, as opposed to actual, experience and 
a failure to use hourly wages results in over-estimates of the unexplained gap. There 
was little or no evidence from their research to support the view that the choice of 
decomposition method or absence of sample selection controls significantly impacted 
on outcomes. While, in an ideal world, all unobserved heterogeneity and selection 
bias would be eliminated in a study of this kind, and only information on actual 
experience and hourly wage rates used, data constraints ensure that this is never 
possible. Nevertheless, the Weichselbaumer & Winter-Ebner (2005) paper suggests 
that, provided estimates are based on actual labour market experience and hourly 
wage rate data, as is the case in this paper, the impact of the remaining potential 
sources of bias are likely to be non-existent or trivial.   
 
The decomposition to be estimated in this study can be written as follows: 
 
l l l l l l m m- ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - )fm m fm f m f m f m m f f m fW W X X X Z Z j j j Zβ β β α α= + + + +  (1) 
 
where W represents log hourly earnings that excludes overtime, X human capital 
characteristics, Z family responsibility controls, J job and firm-level characteristics, 
and α the intercept terms. In the analysis, we adopt an approach where we identify 
and discuss the impact of each of these components separately.  
 
One draw back of the 2003 NES dataset is that we cannot directly account for the 
effect of female labour market absences due to family commitments8, often referred 
to in the literature as “time-out”. However, our data does contain a number of family 
responsibility controls which will, to some extent, proxy for time-out influences. 
 
Given that an objective of this study is to separate out the impact of individual 
characteristics on the gender pay gap, we must be conscious of an identification 
                                                 
8 In theory we can derive “time-out” by subtracting actual experience from potential experience, 
however, respondents appear not to distinguish between pre and post 16 years of age experience, or 
that accrued on a FT or PT basis. Thus, the data does not lend itself to this approach, as in many cases 
estimated “time-out” is actually negative.  
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problem associated with the use of dummy variables in decompositions where the 
number of categorical dummies exceed one (Oaxaca & Ransom, 1999). Specifically, 
it is not possible to estimate the relative effects of any particular dummy variable, as 
the impacts will change depending on the reference category used. Examples of 
groups of variables affected by the identification problem include education, sector, 
occupation, pay bargaining mechanism, etc. To overcome this problem, we follow 
Gardeazabal & Ugidos (2004) and estimate the decompositions imposing a 




The decomposition, as outlined above, indicates that the magnitude of any adjusted 
gender pay gap depends on both differences in the endowments of wage determining 
characteristics held by males and females and differences in the average return to such 
attributes. In this section we shall consider both, firstly dealing briefly with 
differences in attribute endowments (Table A2) and then discussing differences in the 
returns in more detail. The variables included in the study are described in Table A1 
in the Appendix.  
 
3.1 Differences in Attribute Endowments 
 
In relation to the human capital levels of FT employees, relative to their male 
counterparts, females were, on the whole, better qualified. However, as we would 
expect, males’ levels of experience were almost 25 per cent higher than those of 
females. There were few apparent differences in the educational profiles or experience 
levels of male and female PT employees.  
 
Turning to family characteristics, relative to males, females with children of school 
attending age and those cohabiting were much less likely to be active in the FT labour 
market. Regarding job characteristics, FT males were more likely to belong to a trade 
union, supervise staff, work fixed hours and have, an average, employment tenure 
                                                 








=∑ . The 
implementation of this restriction leaves the other coefficients unaffected.  
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almost a third higher than that of FT females. Compared to PT males, PT females had 
slightly longer average employment tenure and were much more likely to work fixed 
hours.  
 
On firm-level characteristics, FT males and females differ in a number of respects. 
Females were more heavily concentrated in firms that offered family-friendly 
policies, such as career breaks, and where a high proportion of managers were female. 
Regarding pay determination, 52 per cent of FT females were employed in firms 
where the NWA was the primary pay determining mechanism compared to 49 per 
cent of FT males. Regarding the national minimum wage, the average firm-level 
coverage rate was approximately 8 per cent. However, this was somewhat higher for 
females (both FT and PT), indicating that they were marginally more likely to be 
employed in low-waged firms. Within the PT distribution, females were again more 
heavily concentrated in firms offering family-friendly policies and employing a higher 
proportion of female managers.  
  
3.2 Differences in Attribute Returns 
 
Table 1 gives the results from OLS models for both male and female FT employees. 
Occupation controls were omitted due to concerns of colinearity, particularly in 
relation to the educational variables. The models also include one-digit industry 
controls that are not reported here10. In addition to the gender specific models, a third 
model was estimated using an interaction term to test for statistically significant 
gender-based differences in the returns to individual attributes. The results from this 
model are also presented in Table 1. 
 
< Table 1 Here > 
 
Dealing firstly with human capital variables, while the returns to a degree were 
broadly comparable, males earned a higher return to post-secondary qualifications and 
certificates/diplomas11. Somewhat surprisingly within this specification, FT males and 
                                                 
10 Results are available from the authors. 
11 The qualification equivalencies for Ireland are as follows: Junior Certificate represents the end of 
compulsory schooling (aged 16); Leaving Certificate is equivalent to high-school diploma; 
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females earned an identical return of 2.7 per cent per year of labour market 
experience.  
 
In relation to family background characteristics, cohabiting females and those with 
children below the age of 6 and above the age of 18 earned substantially less. Given 
that it is not likely that such characteristics will in themselves result in substantial 
wage returns, it is probable that they are capturing, to some extent, the negative 
impact of time-out. A somewhat unexpected result was a slightly higher return 
observed for females with children aged 6 to 17. However, we may be observing a 
selection effect here whereby only more highly paid females with children in this age 
bracket can afford to remain active in the FT labour market.  
 
With regards to job and firm-level variables, unlike males, there was no wage gain to 
FT females belonging to a trade union. However, within the Irish social partnership 
context, the trade union impact on wages is likely to be more heavily felt through the 
NWA. Therefore, given that the wage determination process is fully incorporated 
within our model, the trade union variable may be picking up additional benefits 
accruing to workers over and above those negotiated under the various forms of 
collective regimes. On the issue of pay determination itself, the bargaining variables 
indicate the proportion of workers covered by each form of agreement within each 
firm. The dummy variables are constructed on the basis of firm level coverage 
exceeding 50 per cent12. However, the data indicates that in practice the coverage 
rates in these firms generally range will above 70 per cent, and if indeed we set the 
results at this level our data and results remain largely unchanged. Turning to the 
actual results, FT males employed in firms where the NWA was the dominant pay 
strategy incurred a 7 per cent pay penalty. This was in contrast to the situation for FT 
females where both the NWA and individual-level agreements were associated with 
premiums of 3 and 6 per cent respectively. The results from the OLS models 
demonstrate that females do relatively better under collective bargaining 
arrangements, NWA and industry-level agreements, and individual-level agreements.  
Given that a relatively high proportion of FT females are employed in firms where the 
                                                                                                                                            
Certificate/Diplomas are sub-degree qualifications, generally of a vocational nature, and third-level 
represents graduate-level attainment.  
12 The base case here relates to a situation where no bargaining strategy is dominant within the firm at 
the 50 per cent threshold.  
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NWA is the principal wage bargaining mechanism, it is likely that it will have a 
reducing impact on the gender pay gap.  
 
The minimum wage variable relates to the proportion of the workforce earning the 
national minimum wage and, as such represents the relative penalty to being 
employed in a low-waged firm. While both FT males and females employed in firms 
with a higher proportion of minimum wage workers earned less, the differences 
between the two was relatively small and not statistically significant. Thus, with 
respect to FT workers, there was nothing to suggest that the minimum wage was 
improving the relative position of females. 
 
Some other results relating to job and firm-level characteristics are worthy of 
discussion. While supervisory responsibilities were found to increase the earnings of 
both males and females, the earnings advantage to FT males was somewhat larger. 
With respect to family-friendly policies, FT females earned a larger premium when 
employed in firms offering career breaks. However, no advantage was apparent where 
firms offered the option of work sharing or going part-time. In terms of management 
structure, while females gained some wage benefit from being employed in a female-
led firm, the impact was found to be extremely small in magnitude. There was also a 
higher relative return to females employed in multinationals but a lower pay-off 
within exporting firms.  
 
Table 2 reports the OLS results for PT workers. While the sample size for males is 
somewhat low at just 624, the results appear plausible and we have no reason to 
suspect that they are anything other than robust. Nevertheless, it is likely that the 
sample size may influence the significance of the interaction model, leaving open the 
possibility that some variables that are insignificant within these OLS models will 
ultimately prove to be important within the decomposition.   
 
< Table 2 Here > 
 
As was the case in the FT labour market, PT males again earned a higher return to 
further and higher education. While the return to labour market experience was lower 
for females, the difference was not significant.  
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The family responsibility variables emerged to be unimportant confirming the 
expectation that, in contrast to the situation for FT workers, time-out effects were less 
heavily penalised in this labour market. 
 
Relative to males, PT females earned an 8.5 per cent premium to trade union 
membership, which was the reverse of what was found in the full-time labour market. 
In terms of pay bargaining, PT females benefited significantly from business-level 
agreements. In addition, PT females’ employed in firms implementing the NWA also 
enjoyed a relative wage advantage, and, while this difference was not statistically 
significant, it is likely that the 10 per cent coefficient advantage will prove to have 
some impact in the decomposition.  
 
With regards to the minimum wage, the results suggest that the wage disadvantage to 
females employed in low paying firms is significantly and substantially lower than 
that for PT males. Therefore, in contrast to the results for the FT labour market, there 
is evidence that the minimum wage does improve the relative position of PT females.  
 
Finally, in relation to the other firm and job-level characteristics, there was little 
evidence that PT females benefited from being employed in firms that offered career 




Table 3 gives details of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for FT workers. The 
approach adopted here can be generally described as one of variance decomposition. 
The first column in Table 3 gives the total decomposition (ALL), while subsequent 
columns demonstrate the relative contributions to various attribute sets: human capital 
(HC), family structure (FS), job and firm-level characteristics (JF), industry (IND) 
and occupation (OCC)14.  
                                                 
13 The variable indicating that a firm offered either the option of work sharing or PT work to its 
employees was omitted from the PT wage equation as its obvious correlation with PT work made it 
highly collinear with the constant term and therefore extremely difficult to interpret.  
14 Following convention, despite being omitted from the OLS models, this potentially endogenous set 
of controls were included within the specification used for the decompositions. 
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< Table 3 Here > 
 
The raw wage gap for FT workers was calculated at 17.6 per cent falling to 7.3 per 
cent when account was taken for endowment differences between males and 
females15. Thus, endowment differences accounted for almost 60 per cent of the total 
raw gap. Of this, human capital effects explained approximately one-third, family 
structure one quarter, job and firm characteristics just over a fifth, and industry and 
occupation controls the residual. The relatively small occupational and industry 
endowment effects suggest that gender based occupational and industrial segregation 
is not a major issue within the Irish labour market. The coefficient effects suggest that 
while females, on balance, earn lower returns to human capital, family and job 
characteristics these effects are, to a large degree, counterbalanced by higher 
occupational returns. 
 
We next examine the impact of individual variables using the more detailed 
decomposition breakdown given in Table A3 (Appendix). With regard to human 
capital, the principal impact relates to higher endowments of and returns to experience 
among males16. Greater levels of educational attainment among females reduced the 
gap somewhat. Higher average levels of tenure among males also contributed to a 
widening of the pay gap.  
 
In terms of family background, the most significant influence derives from a 
combination of higher returns to cohabitation among males and a higher incidence of 
male cohabitation. At least to some extent, we suspect the spousal influence to be a 
proxy for the higher levels of time-out typically observed among married females.  
 
On the job and firm-level characteristics front, some substantial influences are 
evident. Most importantly, and consistent with the OLS results, the higher returns to 
females employed in firms implementing the NWA reduced the pay gap by a 
                                                 
15 This is slightly higher than the 5.8 per cent reported for Ireland in 1997 by Barrett et al. (2000); 
however, it must be borne in mind that, unlike this earlier study, we had no direct control for the 
substantial influence of time-out. Barrett et al. (2000) estimated that time-out alone accounted for just 
under 20 per cent of the gender wage gap. The result derived in this paper for 2003, however, is almost 
identical to that found by Callan & Russell (2003) who, using data for 2000, report a gap 7.1 per cent. 
16 While no coefficient advantage to experience was apparent within Table 1, a difference did occur 
when controls for occupation were added to the model.  
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relatively substantial 1.7 per cent. The relative advantage to females employed under 
individual-level agreements was also observed to bring the gap down by a further 0.7 
per cent. Therefore, with respect to the impact of pay bargaining, the results are 
clearly mixed as the gender pay gap is lowered as a result of both collective and 
individual bargaining regimes. While the NWA clearly had the largest impact on the 
gender pay gap, individual-level bargaining was found to be more favourable to 
females relative to some other forms of collective bargaining, specifically industry-
level and business-level agreements. A potential implication of this result is that a 
failure to properly distinguish between different forms of collective bargaining can 
lead to misleading results. Finally, in relation to industrial relations’ type variables, it 
was found that firm-level minimum wage coverage exerted little influence, while 
individual trade union effects favoured males to the extent of widening the pay gap by 
2.2 per cent. Exactly why FT males incur such an advantage, unrelated to pay 
bargaining, from trade union membership over their female counterparts is unclear. 
However, the effect is to more negate any benefits accrued through collective 
bargaining17. 
 
With respect to the remaining job and firm-level characteristics, there was some 
evidence to support the notion that family-friendly policies can be effective. In 
particular, the existence of career breaks at the firm-level led to a 1.6 per cent 
reduction in the differential. Again consistent with the OLS regression model results, 
there was no evidence to support the Becker (1971) Discrimination Tastes Model, 
which predicts that the wage gap will be substantially lower in female-led firms.  
 
In relation to the PT labour market, the decomposition results for which are presented 
in Table 4, the raw wage gap was estimated to be 5.9 per cent, increasing to 9.7 per 
cent when differences in endowments between males and females were taken into 
consideration. In this labour market, coefficient differences were found to close the 
gender pay gap by 1.6 per cent, which was mostly a result of higher returns to 
occupation. In contrast to the FT labour market, PT females were found to have more 
superior human capital levels than their male counterparts. 
                                                 
17 Due to concerns of colinearity between the wage bargaining and trade union membership variables, 
we estimated the regressions and decompositions omitting each variable consecutively and found that 
the results reported in Tables 1 and A3 to be robust.   
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< Table 4 Here > 
 
The more detailed results presented in Table A3 (Appendix) indicate that despite PT 
females having higher levels of human capital, they were found to earn lower returns 
to schooling, particularly at the upper-secondary level, and with respect to experience 
and tenure. As a result, total human capital impacts led to a 2.1 per cent widening in 
the PT gender pay gap. With regards to family background effects, these were, on the 
whole, neutral with the cohabitation effect countered to some extent by influences 
relating to partner employment status.  
 
Again, the effects of most interest relate to job and firm-level characteristics. In 
particular, the gender pay gap was reduced as a result of the NWA (1.0 per cent), 
business-level agreements (0.9 per cent), minimum wage cover (2.6 per cent) and 
individual union membership (2.6 per cent). These results suggest that institutional 
factors associated with trade unions and collective bargaining, play a much more 
important and consistent role in improving equality levels within the PT labour 
market.  
 
Finally, unlike the FT decomposition, the evidence suggests that PT females in firms 
offering career breaks earned less resulting in a significant 3.8 per cent widening of 
the pay gap. This result is in someway consistent with the findings of McCrate (2005), 
Golden (2001) and Glass & Camarigg (1992) who report that males may actually 
have greater access to family-friendly fringe benefits. Coefficient advantages relating 
to both industry and occupational effects were found to heavily favour females and 
were largely responsible for reducing the gap by 2.2 and 8.0 per cent respectively.   
 
3.4 What Can Motivations Tell Us? 
 
One of the novel aspects of the dataset used in this study is that PT workers were 
asked to indicate their reasons for working PT18. The different motivational factors 
specified were: i) have another job, ii) illness, iii) disability, iv) cannot find FT job, v) 
family commitments, vi) financially secure, vii) earn enough working PT, and viii) 
                                                 
18 The same question was not asked of FT workers.  
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other reason. Figure 1 illustrates that there are marked differences between males and 
females regarding their motivations for undertaking PT work. In the sense that such 
variables incorporate the very unique factors that attract individuals into part-time 
work, they will also act as selection controls within the model. Over two-thirds of 
females are concentrated in one category, specifically family commitments, whereas 
approximately 75 per cent of males are dispersed across four categories - cannot find 
a FT job, have another job, family commitments and other.  
 
< Figure 1 Here > 
 
While these differences in motivations are insightful, the question that remains is to 
what extent do they contain information that is informative with regards to the gender 
wage gap? Cleary, individuals’ motivations for working PT will not directly affect 
their wages. However, they will influence the type of jobs that people choose to 
undertake. On this basis, we believe that these motivational factors are likely to 
capture unobserved job characteristics that may directly influence wages19. For 
instance, persons working for family reasons may seek a job that is more permanent 
in nature but at the same time is sufficiently flexible to enable a work-life balance. In 
contrast, an individual who is working PT because they cannot find a FT job may seek 
work that is more temporary in nature and place less of an emphasis on the terms and 
conditions of employment. Thus, on the grounds that motivational factors may be 
acting as proxies for previously unobserved job characteristics, we incorporate them 
into the PT decompositional analysis.  
 
Results from OLS models20 that include the PT motivational variables indicated that 
such influences have a neutral effect on PT female earnings. However, this was not 
the case for males. Relative to males working PT because they have another job, those 
working for family reasons or because they cannot find FT employment, or those in 
the other category, incur large pay penalties21. When these factors are incorporated 
into the decomposition (Table 5) the estimated wage gap changes dramatically. 
                                                 
19 This is in contrast to attitudinal variables included in Swaffield (2007), which, while potentially 
highly correlated with job choice decisions, do not represent a direct measure of job choice motives.  
20 Results are available from the authors. 
21 Results from previous specifications remain stable and robust to the inclusion of the motivational 
variables (results available from authors). 
 17
Specifically, the adjusted pay gap goes from 9.7 to -3.2 per cent. Thus, the results 
suggest that males experience large penalties depending on their motivations for 
working PT, which are likely to reflect job characteristics, and when such factors are 
incorporated into the decomposition analysis the previously observed wage gap is 
eradicated. Accordingly, this interesting outcome raises the question of the extent to 
which the FT adjusted pay gap estimated here, and elsewhere, is likely to be upwardly 
biased given the absence of motivational factors in the modelling framework. 
 
< Table 5 Here > 
 
4.0 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the gender wage gap in Ireland using a relatively unique 
employer-employee matched dataset that enables us to assess the importance of a 
number of institutional and motivational factors. With respect to pay bargaining, 
within the FT labour market, we find that the pay gap was lower in firms 
implementing both the NWA and individual-level bargaining. Thus, while collective 
bargaining at the national level clearly benefited females, individual-level agreements 
were found to outperform other types of collective arrangements, specifically industry 
and business-level agreements. The analysis clearly demonstrates the importance of 
distinguishing between different forms of collective bargaining in studies such as this. 
There was no evidence to support the view that the introduction of the minimum wage 
substantially improved the relatively position of FT females. Furthermore, trade union 
membership put FT females at a relative disadvantage, suggesting that they accrue 
much fewer advantages, over and above those deriving from national collective 
bargaining, than their FT male counterparts. The situation in the PT labour market 
was markedly different with the NWA, business-level agreements, the minimum wage 
and trade union membership all improving the relative position of females, leading to 
a consistent reduction in the gender pay gap. The results, therefore, illustrate that the 
impact of institutional factors differ substantially between the FT and PT labour 
markets, with the beneficial impacts for females much more consistent and 
pronounced  among PT workers. 
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Another feature of the data is that it enabled us, for the PT labour market, to 
investigate the importance of motives, and specifically the extent to which the need to 
achieve work-life balance, existing financial security and so on influenced the pay 
gap. It is reasonable to assume that the nature of the job selected will vary depending 
on the motives for labour market participation and that these previously unobserved 
job factors will have wage consequences. Our results indicate that males sustain large 
penalties depending on their motivations for working PT and when these factors are 
incorporated into the PT decomposition, the previously observed wage gap is 
eliminated. This result raises questions regarding the extent to which existing 
methodologies can effectively estimate the gender pay gap without incorporating 
individuals’ motivations for selecting particular forms of employment, given that such 



























Table 1: Full-Time OLS Models, Ireland, 2003 
 Male Female Difference 
Lower secondary  0.069***  (-0.012) 0.087***  (-0.019) 0.018   (-0.023) 
Upper secondary 0.151***  (-0.012) 0.156***  (-0.017) 0.005  (-0.022) 
Post secondary 0.219***  (-0.012) 0.157***  (-0.019) -0.063***  (-0.024) 
Cert/Diploma 0.354***  (-0.015) 0.287***  (-0.019) -0.067***  (-0.025) 
Degree 0.595***  (-0.016) 0.557***  (-0.02) -0.038  (-0.027) 
Experience 0.027***  (-0.001) 0.027***  (-0.001) -0.001  (-0.002) 
Experience squared -0.000***  (0.000) -0.000***  (0.000) 0  (0.000) 
Professional body 0.144***  (-0.01) 0.169***  (-0.01) 0.025*  (-0.014) 
Child less than 6 0.043***  (-0.008) 0.007  (-0.011) -0.037***  (-0.014) 
Child 6 to 17 -0.004  (-0.008) 0.024***  (-0.009) 0.028**  (-0.012) 
Child over 18 0.029***  (-0.01) -0.030***  (-0.011) -0.060***  (-0.015) 
Cohabit 0.127***  (-0.009) 0.051***  (-0.012) -0.077***  (-0.016) 
Partner works Full-time (FT) -0.033***  (-0.008) -0.005  (-0.012) 0.029*  (-0.015) 
Partner works Part-time (PT) -0.002  (-0.009) -0.048**  (-0.023) -0.046*  (-0.026) 
School run -0.01  (-0.011) -0.001  (-0.011) 0.009  (-0.015) 
Tenure 0.006***  (0.000) 0.007***  (-0.001) 0.001  (-0.001) 
Union membership 0.041***  (-0.007) -0.012  (-0.009) -0.053***  (-0.012) 
Supervise staff 0.213***  (-0.006) 0.181***  (-0.007) -0.031***  (-0.01) 
Flexiwork 0.039***  (-0.007) 0.018**  (-0.008) -0.020*  (-0.011) 
Individual-level wage agreement -0.013  (-0.012) 0.061***  (-0.012) 0.074***  (-0.017) 
Business-level wage agreement -0.041***  (-0.015) -0.008  (-0.015) 0.033  (-0.022) 
Industry-level wage agreement -0.054***  (-0.013) 0.022  (-0.018) 0.076***  (-0.023) 
National-level wage agreement -0.068***  (-0.011) 0.028**  (-0.011) 0.096***  (-0.016) 
Other wage type agreement -0.077***  (-0.023) -0.004  (-0.023) 0.073**  (-0.033) 
Export intensity 0.000***  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) -0.000***  (0.000) 
Foreign-owned firm 0.076***  (-0.008) 0.124***  (-0.009) 0.048***  (-0.013) 
Minimum wage cover -0.049***  (-0.012) -0.076***  (-0.013) -0.027  (-0.018) 
Offers career breaks 0.049***  (-0.01) 0.091***  (-0.011) 0.042***  (-0.015) 
Offers work sharing and/or PT work -0.032***  (-0.007) -0.035***  (-0.008) -0.002  (-0.011) 
Females % of management 0  (0.000) 0.001***  (0.000) 0.001***  (0.000) 
Firm size 0.035***  (-0.002) 0.031***  (-0.002) -0.004  (-0.003) 
Over-educated -0.093***  (-0.011) -0.083***  (-0.010) 0.01  (-0.015)) 
Constant 1.912***  (-0.030) 1.805***  (0.058) -0.090**  (-0.035) 
Observations 19,127 14,057 33,184 
R-squared 0.467 0.488  
Standard errors in parentheses.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 Sector controls included. 
 20
Table 2: Part-Time OLS Models, Ireland, 2003 
 Male Female Difference  
Lower secondary  0.058  (-0.06) 0.098***  (-0.019) 0.04  (-0.057) 
Upper secondary 0.153***  (-0.059) 0.163***  (-0.019) 0.01  (-0.056) 
Post secondary 0.023  (-0.069) 0.130***  (-0.024) 0.107  (-0.066) 
Cert/Diploma 0.185**  (-0.089) 0.372***  (-0.026) 0.186**  (-0.083) 
Degree 0.495***  (-0.095) 0.644***  (-0.033) 0.150*  (-0.091) 
Experience 0.009  (-0.006) 0.005***  (-0.001) -0.004  (-0.005) 
Experience squared -0.000*  (0.000) -0.000***  (0.000) 0.000**  (0.000) 
Professional body 0.141**  (-0.072) 0.085***  (-0.025) -0.056  (-0.068) 
Child less than 6 0.008  (-0.066) 0.051***  (-0.015) 0.043  (-0.06) 
Child 6 to 17 0.034  (-0.05) 0.001  (-0.012) -0.033  (-0.046) 
Child over 18 -0.022  (-0.055) -0.007  (-0.014) 0.015  (-0.050) 
Cohabit 0.132**  (-0.058) 0.040**  (-0.020) -0.093*  (-0.055) 
Partner works Full-time (FT) -0.042  (-0.059) 0.038**  (-0.019) 0.08  (-0.056) 
Partner works Part-time (PT) -0.107*  (-0.055) 0.023  (-0.031) 0.130**  (-0.059) 
School run 0.006  (-0.088) -0.012  (-0.014) -0.018  (-0.079) 
Tenure 0.009***  (-0.003) 0.006***  (-0.001) -0.004 (0.003) 
Union membership -0.001  (-0.048) 0.084***  (-0.015) 0.085*  (-0.045) 
Supervise staff 0.128**  (-0.064) 0.127***  (-0.018) -0.001  (-0.059) 
Flexiwork 0.011  (-0.039) 0.036***  (-0.013) 0.025  (-0.037) 
Individual-level wage agreement -0.013  (-0.077) 0.013  (-0.025) 0.026  (-0.072) 
Business-level wage agreement -0.290***  (-0.101) -0.035  (-0.035) 0.256***  (-0.096) 
Industry-level wage agreement -0.034  (-0.103) -0.03  (-0.032) 0.004  (-0.097) 
National-level wage agreement -0.098  (-0.068) 0.002  (-0.024) 0.101  (-0.065) 
Other wage type agreement -0.133  (-0.154) -0.002  (-0.05) 0.131  (0.146) 
Export intensity 0  (-0.001) -0.000**  (0.000) -0  (0.001) 
Foreign-owned firm 0.084  (-0.085) 0.028  (-0.023) -0.056  (-0.079) 
Minimum wage cover -0.302***  (-0.071) -0.085***  (-0.02) 0.217***  (-0.066) 
Offers career breaks 0.223***  (-0.08) 0.101***  (-0.021) -0.121  (-0.074) 
Firm size 0.006  (-0.013) 0.002  (-0.004) -0.005  (-0.012) 
Females % of management 0  (-0.001) -0.001***  (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 
Over-educated -0.198**  (-0.077) -0.218***  (-0.026) -0.020  (-0.073) 
Constant 2.397***  (-0.242) 2.001***  (-0.118) -0.350***  (-0.114) 
Observations 624 4,874 5,498 
R-squared 0.443 0.292  
Standard errors in parentheses.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 






Table 3: Decompositions of the Full-Time Male\Female Wage Gap 
 
 ALL HC FS JF IND OCC 
Amount attributable: 11.6      
- due to endowments (E): 10.3 3.4 2.7 2.3 1.0 0.9 
- due to coefficients (C): 1.3 1.0 2.7 1.2 0.6 -3.0 
Shift coefficient (U): 6.0      
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}: 17.6      
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 7.3      
       
Endowments as % total (E/R): 58.5 19.3 15.3 13.1 5.7 5.1 




Table 4: Decompositions of the Part-Time Male\Female Wage Gap 
 
 ALL HC FS JF IND OCC 
Amount attributable: -5.4      
- due to endowments (E): -3.8 -1.9 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 -0.4 
- due to coefficients (C): -1.6 4.0 2.3 2.4 2.7 -7.6 
Shift coefficient (U): 11.3      
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}: 5.9      
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 9.7      
       
Endowments as % total (E/R): -64.4 -32.3 -25.4 -8.5 8.5 -6.7 




Table 5: Decompositions of the Part-Time Male\Female Wage Gap 
Incorporating Part-Time Work Motives 
 
 ALL ALL+PT MOTIVES 
Amount attributable: -5.4 -36.2 
- due to endowments (E): -3.8 7.2 
- due to coefficients (C): -1.6 -43.4 
Shift coefficient (U): 11.3 40.2 
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}: 5.9 4.0 
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 9.7 -3.2 
   
Endowments as % total (E/R): -64.4 181.8 
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Table A1: Variable Labels and Definitions 
 
Label Definition 
Human Capital  
lowsec Lower secondary  (1,0 dummy variable) 
upsec Upper secondary (1,0 dummy variable) 
postsec Post secondary (1,0 dummy variable) 
nodeg Cert/diploma (1,0 dummy variable) 
degree Third-level (1,0 dummy variable) 
profbod Professional body (1,0 dummy variable) 
Exp Experience (yrs) 
Expsr Experience squared (yrs) 
tenure Length of time with current employer (yrs) 
  
Family Structure   
childless6 Child less than 6 (1,0 dummy variable) 
child617 Child 6 to 17 (1,0 dummy variable) 
child18 Child over 18 (1,0 dummy variable) 
cohabit Cohabits (1,0 dummy variable) 
partnerft Partner works full-time (FT) (1,0 dummy variable)  
partnerpt Partner works part-time (PT) (1,0 dummy variable) 
schoolrun School run (1,0 dummy variable) 
  
Job and Firm Characteristics  
union Union membership  (1,0 dummy variable) 
supvise Supervise staff  (1,0 dummy variable) 
flexiw Flexi-work (1,0 dummy variable) 
eeag2 Individual wage agreement  (1,0 dummy variable) 
busag2 Business level agreement  (1,0 dummy variable) 
indag2 Industry level agreement  (1,0 dummy variable) 
othag2 Other agreement  (1,0 dummy variable) 
export Percentage of turnover that is generated by exports  
fdi Foreign owned (1,0 dummy variable) 
mincov Minimum wage cover (%) 
careerbk Offers career breaks (1,0 dummy variable) 
worksh Work sharing and/or PT work offered (1,0 dummy variable) 
fsize Firm size (continuous) 
femlead3 Females % of management 
  
Occupation  
occup1 Managers & administrators (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup2 Professional (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup3 Associate professional & technical (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup4 Clerical & secretarial (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup5 Craft & related (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup6 Personal & protective service (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup7 Sales (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup8 Plant & machine operatives (1,0 dummy variable) 
occup9 Other (1,0 dummy variable) 
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sector1 Mining, quarrying & manufacturing (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector2 Electricity, gas & water (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector3 Construction (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector4 Wholesale & retail (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector5 Hotels & restaurants (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector6 Transport, storage & communication (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector7 Financial intermediation (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector8 Business services (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector9 Public administration & defence (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector10 Education (1,0 dummy variable) 
sector11 Health & social work (1,0 dummy variable) 






























Table A2: Summary Statistics of Available Data* 
 Male FT Female FT Male PT Female PT 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
         
Primary 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.18 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 
Lower secondary  0.19 0.39 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 
Upper secondary 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 
Post secondary 0.17 0.38 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.29 
Cert/Diploma 0.10 0.30 0.19 0.39 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.32 
Degree 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 
Experience 17.38 11.82 13.18 9.36 18.69 14.10 15.33 11.04 
Experience squared 441.90 513.92 261.32 347.96 547.81 635.76 356.84 1917.16
Tenure 9.68 9.40 7.29 7.53 6.66 7.50 7.48 6.95 
Private sector 0.85 0.35 0.80 0.40 0.77 0.42 0.72 0.45 
Professional body 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.26 
Child less than 6 0.18 0.39 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.44 
Child 6 to 17 0.27 0.44 0.18 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.49 0.50 
Child over 18 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.37 0.24 0.43 
Cohabit 0.61 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.73 0.44 
Partner works full-time (FT) 0.27 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.62 0.49 
Partner works part-time (PT) 0.16 0.37 0.02 0.15 0.17 0.38 0.04 0.20 
School run 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.21 0.24 0.42 
Union membership 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Supervise staff 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.34 
Flexiwork 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.43 0.50 0.32 0.47 
National-level wage agreement 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.59 0.49 
Individual-level wage agreement 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 
Business-level wage agreement 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 
Industry-level wage agreement 0.13 0.33 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 
Other wage type agreement 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
Export intensity 29.87 41.57 43.26 46.09 33.34 44.42 42.15 47.46 
Foreign-owned firm 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.27 
Minimum wage cover 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.28 0.11 0.30 
Offers career breaks 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.36 0.48 
Offers work sharing and/or PT work 0.65 0.48 0.80 0.40 0.77 0.42 0.90 0.30 
Firm size 4.88 2.11 5.16 2.29 4.73 2.43 5.18 2.72 
Females % of management 6.82 20.57 22.11 37.46 6.51 22.02 17.12 33.98 
Managers and administrators  0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.18 
Professional 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.24 
Associate profession & technical 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.21 0.14 0.35 
Clerical and secretarial 0.07 0.25 0.28 0.45 0.07 0.25 0.22 0.42 
Craft and related 0.25 0.43 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.10 
Personal and protective service 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Sales 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38 
Plant and machine operatives 0.17 0.37 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.39 0.03 0.16 
Other 0.10 0.30 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35 
Mining, quarrying & manufacturing 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.06 0.24 
Electricity, gas & water** - - - - - - - - 
Construction 0.19 0.39 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.10 
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Table A2 continued:  
 
 Male FT Female FT Male PT Female PT 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
         
Wholesale & retail 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 
Hotels & restaurants 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 
Transport, storage & communication 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.16 
Financial intermediation 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.19 
Business services 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.08 0.26 0.08 0.27 
Public administration & defence 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20 
Education 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 
Health & social work 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.31 0.46 
Other services 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.23 
Note: *Std. Dev. is abbreviation for standard deviation. 




































Table A3: Breakdown of Decomposition Results by Variable* 
 Full-time Part-time 
Variable Attrib Endow Coeff Attrib Endow Coeff 
Human Capital:       
Primary -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 -0.5 0.7 
Lower secondary  -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 
Upper secondary -0.2 0.2 -0.4 2.3 -0.5 2.8 
Post secondary 0.6 0.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
Cert/Diploma -0.2 -0.6 0.4 -1.7 0.2 -1.9 
Degree -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 0.5 1.2 -0.7 
Experience 18.1 15.3 2.8 12.7 3.6 9.1 
Experience squared -11.8 -11.0 -0.8 -14.5 -5.6 -8.9 
Tenure 1.0 1.7 -0.7 1.7 -0.3 2.0 
Professional body -0.3 0.1 -0.4 0.7 0.2 0.5 
 4.4 3.4 1.0 2.1 -1.9 4.0 
Family Background:       
Child less than 6 0.6 0.2 0.4 -1.3 0.2 -1.5 
Child 6 to 17 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.3 
Child over 18 0.6 0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 
Cohabit 5.3 1.9 3.4 6.1 -2.4 8.5 
Partner works Full-time (FT) -0.4 0.6 -1.0 -2.9 2.1 -5.0 
Partner works Part-time (PT) 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 
School run -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 1.0 
 5.4 2.7 2.7 0.8 -1.5 2.3 
Job and Firm:       
Union membership 2.2 0.7 1.5 -2.6 0.0 -2.6 
Supervise staff 1.4 1.2 0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3 
Flexiwork 0.7 0.0 0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.5 
Individual-level wage agreement -0.7 -0.1 -0.6 1.8 -0.2 2.0 
Business-level wage agreement 0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.9 0.0 -0.9 
Industry-level wage agreement -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 
National-level wage agreement -1.7 0.0 -1.7 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 
Other wage type agreement 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
No majority wage agreement 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.5 
Export intensity 0.8 -0.3 1.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 
Foreign-owned firm -0.9 0.1 -1.0 0.2 -0.1 0.3 
Minimum wage cover 0.2 0.0 0.2 -2.6 0.0 -2.6 
Offers career breaks -1.6 -0.1 -1.5 3.8 -0.2 4.0 
Offers work sharing and/or PT work 0.0 0.4 -0.3 - - - 
Firm size 1.9 0.1 1.8 2.3 -0.1 2.4 
Females % of management 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.4 1.1 
Over-educated 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
 3.5 2.3 1.2 1.9 -0.5 2.4 
Industry:       
Mining, quarrying & manufacturing -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 
Electricity, gas & water** - - - - - - 
Construction 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Wholesale & retail 0.8 0.0 0.8 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 
Hotels & restaurants 0.1 0.1 0.0 -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 
Transport, storage & communication 0.3 0.1 0.2 -1.4 -0.7 -0.7 
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Table A3 continued:  
 
 Full-time Part-time 
Variable Attrib Endow Coeff Attrib Endow Coeff 
       
Industry:       
Financial intermediation -0.5 -1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 0.5 
Business services -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -1.7 0.2 -1.9 
Public administration & defence -0.4 0.1 -0.5 0.9 0.0 0.9 
Education -0.2 -0.4 0.2 1.8 0.9 0.9 
Health & social work -0.4 1.1 -1.4 -0.9 1.1 -2.0 
Other Services -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 
 0.4 1.0 -0.6 -2.2 0.5 -2.7 
Occupation:       
Managers and administrators  1.4 1.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
Professional 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 
Associate profession & technical 0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.4 -1.1 0.7 
Clerical and secretarial -1.4 2.0 -3.4 -3.9 2.2 -6.1 
Craft and related -0.5 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 
Personal and protective service -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.4 
Sales 0.3 0.1 0.2 -1.0 0.9 -1.9 
Plant and machine operatives -0.8 -1.3 0.5 0.2 -0.2 0.4 
Other -1.1 -1.0 -0.1 -1.9 -1.6 -0.3 
 -2.1 0.9 -3.0 -8.0 -0.4 -7.6 
       
       
Subtotal 11.6 10.3 1.3 -5.4 -3.8 -1.6 
Note: *Attrib, Endow and Coeff are abbreviations for attribute, endowment and coefficient 
respectively.  
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